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Abstract—Absence of memory or verbal recall for symptom 
acquisition in fear and trauma exposure, as well as absence of 
successful coping behavior for life events, is associated with a 
number of diagnoses, including traumatic brain injury, post-
traumatic stress disorder, pain, and anxiety. The difficulty with 
diagnosis and treatment planning based on the absence of 
recall, memory, and successful coping behavior is threefold: 
(1) these assessments do not distinguish between disruption of 
behavior and lack of capacity, (2) the absence of verbal recall 
and memory complicates cognitive-based treatment, and (3) a 
confounding issue is the same absent behavior can be observed 
at different times and contexts. While memory of the specific 
details of the initial traumatic event(s) may not be available to 
verbal report, the existence of time- and context-dependent 
relationships for the initial as well as subsequent experiences is 
arguable. The absence of memory or lack of verbal recall does 
not rule out measurable physiological bodily responses for the 
initial trauma(s), nor does it help to establish the effects of sub-
sequent experiences for symptom expression. Also, the 
absence of memory must include the prospect of fear-based 
learning that does not require or involve the cortex. It is posited 
that the literatures of fear conditioning and learned nonuse pro-
vide complementary illustrations of how the time and context 
of the initial trauma(s) and subsequent experiences affect 
behavior, which is not dependent on the effected individual 
being able to provide a memory-based verbal report. The repli-
cated clinical application demonstrates that, without scientific 
demonstration, neither neuroanatomy nor verbal report can be 
assumed sufficient to predict overt behavior or physiologic 
responses. For example, while commonly assumed to be pre-
dictively so, autonomic nervous system innervation is insuffi-
cient to define the unique stimulus- and context-dependent 
physiological responses of an individual. By recording simulta-
neous physiological responses to the controlled presentation of 
a context-dependent stimulus, the unique relationships of phys-
iology and overt behaviors for the individual can be demon-
strated. Using this process also allows more complex virtual 
reality or other in vivo stimulus assessments to be incorporated 
for the development of individually tailored assessments and 
therapeutic plans. Thus, with or without memory or verbal 
recall, the use of multiple time- and context-specific simultane-
ous physiological measures and overt behavior can guide clini-
cal effort as well as serve to objectively assess the ongoing 
treatment and its outcome.
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INTRODUCTION
The absence of memory or verbal recall for symptom 
acquisition, as well as the absence of successful coping 
for life events, is associated with a number of diagnoses, 
including traumatic brain injury (TBI), posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), pain, and anxiety. Including the 
“absence of behavior” in the reasoning for assignment of 
such diagnoses can be important to the description of 
prior existing conditions, especially if a method of mea-
suring it is outlined. However, while of possible diagnos-
tic importance, the absence of behavior is nonquantifiable 
and does not address the significant issue of whether 
absence is because of the disruption or incapacity for 
behavior. A focus on the absence of behavior potentially 
introduces a further issue by treating nonobserved and 
observed behaviors equally.
Confounding any effort is that assessment and treat-
ment planning for highly variable events are not con-
ducted at the time or context of the trauma(s). Therefore, 
such efforts must be undertaken without the benefit of 
being able to objectively differentiate the effects of the 
original and subsequent experiences on the current state 
[1–2]. Notably, the absence of verbal recall or memory of 
the initial trauma(s) does not preclude subsequent experi-
ences from being remembered or having an effect on 
symptom expression. In addition, not having access to the 
individual’s cognitive and emotional capabilities over the 
same time and context precludes measuring any variation 
and possible effect. The continuous process of the individ-
ual’s attempts for adaptation introduces additional time- 
and context-dependent based efforts that can affect behav-
ior in highly variable ways. Knowing these factors would 
provide both a historical and contemporary perspective of 
how the process affects an individual’s current functional 
state [3].
Further complicating the process of attempting to 
document the effect of trauma is that the noted absence of 
behavior is commonly attributed to multiple causative 
explanations that include genes, “failure to learn,” moti-
vation, and neurological damage, all of which can affect 
prospective considerations for treatment. Genes take on a 
seemingly irrefutable power, even in the absence of the 
scientific demonstration of cause and effect. Often over-
looked is that possessing the genetic characteristic does 
not determine the effect, as in the case of the gene associ-
ated with alcoholism, which still requires an individual to 
drink to sufficient excess. Parenthetically, alcoholism can 
occur without the requisite gene. Additionally, the fact 
that one monozygotic twin can develop normally and the 
other be diagnosed as autistic makes an effective case for 
consideration of additional contributing factors. Simi-
larly, the attribution of failure to learn avoids the question 
of whether such failure is caused by lack of adequate 
training. The inferred and assigned construct “lack of 
motivation” further obscures the failure to improve by 
blaming the person being treated. Also widely assumed is 
that neural trauma of a known anatomical structure is suf-
ficient reason not only for the absence but also for the 
prediction of recovery of behavior [4]. A conceptual 
model based on known scientific evidence would be ben-
eficial so as to avoid resorting to the use of absence of 
behavior and potentially engaging in circular logic and 
self-fulfilling prophecy. The potential for doing no harm 
can also be improved on.
METHODS
Existing replicated scientific literature was reviewed 
for clinical applicability to the aforementioned condi-
tions. The scientific-based relationships for structure and 
function, the relationship of environmental- and time-
based influences on learning, and the presence or absence 
of declarative memory in fear- and trauma-based symp-
tom acquisition was considered. Two areas of research, 
fear conditioning and learned nonuse theory, provided 
substantive findings addressing these criteria.
A recent publication by Arzi et al. demonstrates 
learning during sleep [5]. Elicitation of the conditioned 
responses (CRs) in the nonsleep state is specific to the 
sleep stage present during training. Absence of verbal 
recall during the nonsleep state did not prevent successful 
demonstration of sleep-based learning. The premise that 
learning can be demonstrated to occur without awareness 
or verbal recall is supported. Bodily responses can be 
used to demonstrate such phenomenon, and clinical 
application can be developed to address the relevant time 
and context parameters.
Fear conditioning research provides an emotion-
based relationship for stimulus-specific acquisition and 
retention of learned behavior in mammals. The classic [6] 
conditioning paradigm has been reliably demonstrated 
across a wide range of species, including primates [7]. 
Placing a rat in a box with an electrified grid that can be 
turned on and off illustrates this paradigm. A slight tone 1211
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is sounded preceding the onset of shock. Recall that 
slight variations in the timing of the involved stimuli are 
scientifically demonstrated to have profound effect on 
the learning process. In this instance, learning is demon-
strated when the rat responds to the sound stimulus and 
escapes as it previously did to the shock. Animals 
quickly learn and retain this behavior.
Extensive scientific studies of fear conditioning 
across many species have been carried out, including his-
tologically verified ablations to determine the involve-
ment of specific brain areas in learning and memory, 
electrophysiological recordings documenting both the 
time and sequence of specific brain area response, and 
chemical blocking agents that reduce or eliminate spe-
cific kinds of neural activity in a related brain area [8]. 
The results from these multifaceted replicated research 
studies have established relationships for specific areas 
of the brain and their effect on acquisition or retention of 
fear conditioning [7,9–15]. Learning and memory for sin-
gle-cue fear conditioning does not require cortical 
involvement [16–18]. Also, fear-conditioned learning 
occurs very quickly via specific amygdala and thalamic 
subcortical pathways activating the hypothalamic and 
autonomic nervous systems (ANS) with associated organ 
responses [19]. Such organ responses to fear reflect a pri-
mary emotion, providing survival benefit throughout the 
life span. For instance, when walking along a pathway, a 
noncortically mediated response to what looks like a 
snake leads to the startle response and escape. The cortex 
can then determine whether the object was a snake or not. 
True, people may react to more false alarms, but there 
will also be fewer snake bites.
Learned nonuse research addresses how damage to 
neural structure, the passage of time, and environmental 
context can affect behavior. It also provides an elegant 
demonstration of the need for caution in interpreting the 
role structure plays in function and behavior. Reciprocally, 
the use of behavior to infer the contributing structure 
requires equal caution. Existing beliefs for the function of 
known neural systems are further challenged by simulta-
neous measurement of physiological responses specific to 
time and context.
For over 75 years, the unilateral surgical deafferenta-
tion of the upper limb in the monkey [4], with its subse-
quent absence of purposeful use of that limb, was 
dogmatically presented as proof of the relationship 
between afferent innervation and behavior. Based on 
absence of behavior, the observed conditional relation-
ship was then confounded by the use of illogical bicondi-
tional reasoning that recovery could not be gained and 
seeking other explanation need not be undertaken.
The belief persisted until Taub [20] scientifically dem-
onstrated that bilateral surgical deafferentation of the upper 
limbs in the monkey did not result in the same loss of pur-
poseful use, as did unilateral deafferentation [21–22]. Spe-
cifically, loss of innervation to one upper limb led to loss 
of function, while the loss of innervation to both upper 
limbs did not. Furthermore, prenatal and perinatal somato-
sensory unilateral deafferentation did not result in the same 
loss of function as with the adult monkey [23]. The surgi-
cally sectioned sensory and afferent pathways of the upper 
limbs, unilateral and bilateral, were histologically verified, 
providing scientific demonstration of the insufficiency of 
the explanation based on neuroanatomy and absence of 
behavior.
It is widely accepted that behavior involves more 
than the connecting neural pathways, along with the 
belief that function cannot occur without the connecting 
sensory pathways. Taub’s research did not disprove all 
relationships between anatomy and function, but it did 
confront the existing belief that anatomy is a sufficient 
explanation for behavior. The relationships between anat-
omy and behavior must be scientifically proven and not 
based on belief, even strongly held beliefs.
Through multiple elegant and innovative experimen-
tal demonstrations, the absence of purposeful behavior 
following unilateral deafferentation was attributed to 
postsurgical learned nonuse [20,24–28]. Supporting this 
hypothesis, Taub and Goldberg demonstrated that lack of 
recovery of purposeful behavior involved both time- and 
context-dependent learning [29]. Contributing to this 
demonstration and understanding was that restricted use 
of the unilaterally deafferented limb during the postsurgi-
cal shock period resulted in some spontaneous recovery 
of function [3]. A caveat is that the spontaneous recovery 
following the postsurgical restraint did not achieve 
results as great as were demonstrated following the 
development of the behavior training method constraint-
induced movement therapy (CIMT) [3].
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CIMT demonstrated that time-delayed restraint of the 
nonsurgical limb during behavior training of the unilat-
eral surgically deafferented limb led to the recovery of 1212
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purposeful use in monkeys [23,29–30] and in humans 
after stroke [31]. In some cases, the CIMT achieved vol-
untary purposeful behavior consistent with presurgical 
limb function, providing further support for Taub’s 
hypothesis of learned nonuse. While early human clinical 
research focused on the use of CIMT following stroke 
[20,25], a series of internationally funded scientific stud-
ies subsequently demonstrated applicability following 
other traumas, including upper limbs after TBI, lower 
limbs after stroke, spinal cord injury, fractured hip, and 
aphasia after stroke [32–37].
The demonstration of time- and context-dependent 
learned nonuse is critical to Taub’s research. Restricting 
postsurgical limb use during the postsurgical shock period 
led to some spontaneous recovery. This finding has been 
of limited benefit because while restricting the use of a 
deafferented limb is experimentally controllable, knowing 
how long to prevent use is problematic because the post-
surgical shock period can vary widely across individuals 
[3]. Again, the absence of behavior does not provide a 
meaningful way to determine the end of the postsurgical 
shock period or when to allow voluntary limb use in the 
spontaneous recovery process. What remains clear is that 
the surgically induced neurological trauma with the 
immediate attempted postsurgical use led to decreased 
spontaneous recovery of behavior. The resulting absence 
of behavior had previously limited treatment expectations 
for recovery of limb function until the demonstration of 
learned nonuse. Complicating spontaneous trauma and 
fear experiences are the absence of precisely induced neu-
rologic injury; possible and probable multiple contribut-
ing injuries; unknown time and context variables that 
affect learning; specific results for such experiences; and 
singular reliance on memory and verbal recall of those 
factors for diagnosis, assessment, and treatment. Further-
more, as with stroke and training for the substituted use of 
the nonaffected limb, treatment efforts following 
trauma(s) can interfere with regaining function. Until 
additional research can provide greater clarification, 
incorporating existing knowledge for learned nonuse and 
CIMT can conceptually broaden and benefit treatment 
efforts while avoiding potential harm.
The evolution of scientific research for fear condi-
tioning and learned nonuse illustrates the benefit of and 
need for increased elucidation of the complex effect(s) of 
time- and context-dependent variables on all behavior 
[1–3,7]. Surely of benefit to assessment and treatment 
planning would be a detailed time- and context-based 
history for all events associated with the trauma and the 
subsequent courses of action [2]. In support of the effect 
of time and context on learning and its relevance to our 
present scientific and clinical understanding is the dem-
onstration of a continuum for mammalian responses, 
which is not restricted to observable overt behavior 
[8,38]. For instance, a single cell as well as multiple cells 
can be trained to respond conditionally [16]. Such dem-
onstrations do not tell us why there is a response, nor do 
they necessarily provide answers for the absence of 
response when observing across levels of response, cellu-
lar to overt behavior. However, the utilized training pro-
cesses do reliably establish the relevant time and context 
variables that affect the parameters for acquisition of the 
response across these various levels. Taub’s innovative 
and highly awarded collective research demonstrated that 
time and context can affect both the absence and pres-
ence of behaviors leading to very different conclusions. 
These conclusions were not straightforward and could 
not be automatically assumed based on genetics, anat-
omy, theoretical concepts, or beliefs. Scientific verifica-
tion increases the probability that the critical questions 
are asked and that any possible harm is avoided [39].
Thus, fear conditioning provides scientific demon-
stration of time- and context-dependent behavior both for 
CRs that are hardwired in [40] and those that occur 
before involvement of the cortex [7]. Learned nonuse 
provides specific illustration that surgically induced sen-
sory neurological damage did not predict recovery of 
behavior. It is probable that one or the combination of 
these literatures can be applied in the demonstration of 
individually specific physiologic effects reflective of the 
initial trauma(s) and fear, as well as of subsequent experi-
ences and behavior. Until recently, the diagnosis of 
PTSD, a condition that can involve fear and trauma, was 
excluded when there was an absence of memory for the 
actual traumatic event(s). The absence of memory was 
challenged for multiple reasons, including that it does not 
disprove that precipitating traumatic events occurred, that 
subsequent events do affect the condition and memory, 
and the fact that this phenomenon is both not unusual and 
commonly observed in clinical practice [41]. While rep-
resenting greater inclusion for clinical diagnosis, this the-
oretical reformulation did not address or resolve the issue 
of whether absence of memory for traumatic events is 
based on lack of verbal recall, incapacity to remember, or 
possible misinformation.1213
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Another unresolved issue for improved understanding 
of the effects of trauma, especially when it occurs on the 
battlefield, is that systematic recording of the time and 
context of traumatic events does not occur. Neither is 
there agreed upon or consistently utilized nomenclature 
for recording and establishing what constitutes fear- and 
trauma-based events [2]. Thus, relative factors that could 
benefit assessment and treatment planning are limited or 
lost. Also, collaborative observers are rarely available to 
provide any firsthand detail of the traumatic events. When 
they are, they too can experience similar problems that 
affect their verbal recall and memory. Even when these 
individuals experienced no trauma, the opportunity to 
interview them is usually time-delayed and out of context. 
The literature for recall of memories provides caveat for 
great caution no matter the circumstance. These limita-
tions and an extensive literature for identifying triggering 
stimuli that affect physiologic responses make a strong 
case for the combined use of physiological and overt 
behavior measures. Stimulus-specific physiological and 
overt behavior responses have been recorded for a wide 
range of individuals, from athletic peak performance to 
numerous diagnoses including traumatic events [34,42–
43]. However, such an effort must be implemented with 
great consideration. One consideration is that controlled 
studies with time- and context-dependent averaged 
responses are typically seen. Averaging removes the 
physiological variability of the individually unique and 
critical response patterns that are used to demonstrate the 
time and context relationships for behavior.
While individually specific physiological measures 
provide an objective means to address the effects associ-
ated with human trauma(s) and fear, how the process is 
conducted and what is measured requires considering 
some critical issues. The classical teaching of physiologi-
cal response based on neural pathways, implying that the 
innervation is sufficient to predict behavior, is signifi-
cant. For instance, it is commonly assumed that the sym-
pathetic nervous system (SNS) and parasympathetic 
nervous system (PNS) branches of the ANS respond uni-
formly to a common stimulus across individuals. Typi-
cally not taught is that, in humans, known SNS and PNS 
innervation does not preclude objectively measured 
physiological responses that are inconsistent with such 
beliefs [44–45]. Over 30 years of multiple personally 
conducted, computer-based physiologic measures of 
human responses demonstrate that individual patterns of 
response not only occur but are common. Furthermore, 
confounding our understanding are analyses of past 
research that are based on assumptions inconsistent with 
more recent multidisciplinary research demonstrating 
that cardiovascular and respiratory function can be 
affected by three, not two, neurological pathways [46–
52]. The newer findings affect many prior studies that 
infer ANS-based measures without neurophysiological 
differentiation as to whether the overt behavior repre-
sented “freeze,” “fight or flight,” or “relaxation.” What 
confounds understanding for such a relationship is that, 
as illustrated by the fear conditioning research, the cortex 
need not be involved for there to be physiologic 
response(s). Animal studies of time-series recordings 
indicate that the amygdala, limbic system, and down-
stream organ responses occur before the cortex is 
involved. Adding to the problem is that in fear condition-
ing, CRs do not differentiate those elicited by the condi-
tioned stimulus and those acquired through learning [7]. 
Specifically, how can it be known whether an overt 
behavior is cognitively mediated? Again, objective 
recordings provide a means to move beyond inferred 
assumptions or beliefs that are not based in science.
What remains reliable is that patterns of physiologic 
response can be observed both with and without the indi-
vidual’s awareness of their response(s). When recording 
is conducted without the individual knowing what is 
being recorded, their verbal report is usually inaccurate 
for the response or its direction. Most often, he or she 
verbally reports that he or she does not know and is 
unable to determine the answer to such question(s). Some 
individuals guess more accurately but do so without great 
confidence in their answer. Clearly, verbal recall alone is 
insufficient to establish the veracity of the individual’s 
physiologic response. Parenthetically, prediction of phys-
iologic response(s) based on overt behavior is no more 
reliably predicted by an observer. What can be demon-
strated and is of importance is that whether the individual 
or the observer knows “whether” or “what” response has 
occurred does not prevent time- and contextual-based 
stimulus-response relationships from being objectively 
established [53–54]. The simultaneous measurement of 
multiple physiological measures is required to demon-
strate such complex phenomena. That the individual’s 
responses can vary for specific stimuli and contexts rein-
forces the need for multiple repeated systematic physio-
logical measurements [44–55]. Such multiple objective 
measures provide a truly efficacious means to identify 
individual responses to a given stimulus, both within and 1214
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across contexts. Thus, the false rejection of existing stim-
ulus-response relationships that is based on a single phys-
iologic measure is avoided. Such response variations are 
not unique or restricted to those individuals with trauma- 
or fear-based histories. Simply put, neural pathways, 
including those for the ANS, are insufficient to predict 
individual physiological organ response to stimulus, 
within or across contexts. Thus, recording multiple time- 
and context-specific physiologic stimulus measures pro-
vides greater objectivity for both assessment and treat-
ment. The benefits of establishing multiple objectively 
recorded physiological measures seem straightforward. 
What is hoped for is that the obvious benefit of these 
measures moves assessment and treatment conceptual-
ization beyond reliance on the absence of behavior.
Arguable for consideration and adaptation in clinical 
application is the process of systematic desensitization 
[56]. It is acknowledged that treatment of simple phobia 
can succeed without the individual knowing or the thera-
pist being required to determine the memory for the 
acquisition of such fear. However, a limitation of system-
atic desensitization is that overt behavioral response typi-
cally used to establish the phobia as well as the treatment 
effect does not reliably predict any associated physio-
logic response(s). Therefore, this and similar approaches 
based solely on overt behavior are insufficient in the 
assessment and treatment of TBI, PTSD, pain, and anxi-
ety for multiple reasons. First, any trauma- or fear-based 
absence of response is not measurable through observa-
tion of overt behavior. Second, overt behavior is not ade-
quate to infer unmeasured nonrecorded physiological 
response. Third, nonrecorded physiologic measures can 
occur in directions unpredictable based on overt behav-
ioral response. Fourth, behavior response is no more suf-
ficient to predict physiology than physiology is to predict 
overt behavior. Simply put, standing motionless in 
response to a stimulus can be either a behavior inferred to 
be a calm non-SNS arousal or a freeze response associ-
ated with high arousal mediated via non-ANS pathways 
[46–52].
While procedures for training of overt behavior are 
widely known, the procedures for training for successful 
self-regulation of physiology are not as widely known or 
used. Such control of physiological response has been 
repeatedly demonstrated for nonhumans and humans 
using established training procedures. In nonhuman 
research, such change is often accomplished using some 
stimulus-response procedure to demonstrate change in 
the desired direction. For humans, other established pro-
cedures for training of learned objectively demonstrated 
response are used and published. However, the training 
procedures do not establish how an individual learns self-
regulation of physiological control. Additionally, the 
numbers of required training trials can and will likely 
vary across individuals. Successful training is not deter-
mined by some predetermined number of trials but as an 
objectively demonstrated competency. Note that research 
designs based on the same number of training trials for 
each participant to test the effect of learned physiological 
self-control for a designated symptom benefit are inher-
ently faulty and misleading. In such cases, what is tested 
is whether all individuals learn equally for the same num-
ber of training trials. Training to objective competency 
demonstrated by differential physiological self-control is 
required before comparison can be made for any symp-
tom benefit. As previously noted, it is frequently 
observed that, during self-control training for one physio-
logical measure, there can be spontaneous changes in 
other measures. Again, these spontaneous shifts often 
occur in the opposite direction as predicted by neuroana-
tomical innervation.
In addition to demonstrated learned self-regulation of 
physiology by nontraumatically affected individuals, 
those with lower intelligence quotient scores, brain dam-
age, and other trauma have learned control of specific 
physiological response associated with symptom change 
in the desired direction. These include the differential 
control of electroencephalography to reduce medically 
unresponsive epileptic seizures [57–58] and other condi-
tions [59], as well as the aforementioned training and 
recovery of affected limbs following stroke [3], the upper 
limbs after TBI, the lower limbs after stroke, spinal cord 
injury, fractured hip, and aphasia after stroke [33–37]. 
What has also been demonstrated is that the presence of 
verbal report or lack of memory does not determine 
whether voluntary control of physiological response can 
be trained. Parenthetically, trained differential self-control 
(increase or decrease) of physiological response to the 
same cue has also been demonstrated. This training can 
and often does occur with the individual sitting quietly in 
a reclining chair. Again, observation of the individual sit-
ting quietly does not allow accurate prediction of the 
physiological responses. Redundantly, assessment and 
clinical therapies based solely on the presence or absence 
of verbal report or overt behavior do not account for these 
possibilities. Therefore, observed overt behavioral 1215
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response without objective physiological measures can 
miss the mark for multiple reasons, including time, con-
text, adaptation, and method of measurement. Assumption 
based solely on patient motivation should evoke even 
greater caution.
Without additional objective measures, what still 
remains unanswered is whether an absence of behavior is 
because of a disruption or lack of capacity, with or without 
trauma. Whether the cortex was involved in the response to 
the initial and/or any subsequent traumatic stimuli is also 
not determined. Taub’s devised CIMT training obtained 
beneficial therapeutic results without answers to these 
questions. It is plausible that the benefit of such simultane-
ous objective measurement of overt behavior and physio-
logical responses would include a more objectively based 
understanding of the probable mind and body interactions 
[60]. It is encouraging that by incorporating both physio-
logic and overt behavior, with or without awareness, the 
capacity for training self-control of physiological response 
can be used to address the probable stimuli associated with 
symptom acquisition and subsequent experience. Such 
learning can have powerful influence on the individual’s 
present and future behavior.
CONCLUSIONS
Without including both overt behavior and physio-
logical responses in assessment and treatment planning, 
reports of success for cognitive behavioral therapies 
(CBTs) based conceptually on “toughing it out” are of 
concern. The history of “flooding,” “immersion,” and 
“implosion” therapies for phobia extinction that involve 
facing one’s fear until no longer fearful are examples of 
such logical strategies. Historically, the effectiveness and 
merit of such efforts are not without controversy [61–62]. 
Even when an individual is able to remain in the feared 
context until they no longer report being afraid, his or her 
verbal report does not provide objective demonstration of 
anticipated physiological benefit, nor does it demonstrate 
that there was no adverse effect on physiology [46–52]. It 
is obvious that an assumed relationship between cogni-
tion, physiology, and overt behavior cannot be used both 
as the basis for such treatments and as rejection of the 
need for physiological measurement to verify any treat-
ment effect. As with absence of behavior, the nonmea-
sured physiological responses reflect unknowns and 
cannot be used to infer positive or rule out negative effect 
on physiology, health, or overt behavior [63]. Modifying 
CBT procedures to incorporate objective assessment and 
treatment based on time- and context-dependent physio-
logical measures to address these concerns for the 
unknown would seem desirable [39].
Similarly, teaching cognitive control for “mindful-
ness” infers physiological benefit. Again, verbal report 
and overt behavior are inadequate to infer context-specific 
physiological responses. As previously noted, overt 
behavior can represent one thing to an observer and a 
totally different experience for the individual. How does 
one differentiate whether the overt behavior of standing 
motionless in the presence of a known fear-triggering 
stimulus reflects fight or flight, relaxation, or freeze 
response physiology? It is compelling that these responses 
can appear similar but represent very different physiologi-
cal states mediated via different areas of brain and neuro-
logical pathways [47–52]. Such distinctions are not 
irrelevant or inconsequential for training adaptation to 
environmental demand, health, or longevity. Failing to 
address such distinction stops clinicians from providing 
the most meaningful guidance in assessment, planning, or 
selection of treatment. More problematic is there likely 
will be decreased confidence for “doing no harm.”
Adaptation in life is never-ending and cannot be 
defined without time- and context-referenced measure. 
Establishing an objectively determined relationship of an 
individual’s response to the presentation of known stimu-
lus based on multiple levels of objective measures of 
overt and physiologic behavior provides a more inclusive 
and represented process. Once identified, the opportunity 
exists to use this information to develop individualized 
therapeutic strategies that address the unknown and com-
plex conditions of TBI, PTSD, pain, and anxiety with or 
without memory of fear and/or trauma(s). These same 
procedures can be used to establish an objective measure 
of an individual’s ongoing treatment process. In addition, 
they provide for the assessment of treatment outcome as 
well as information to be used for developing future ther-
apeutic efforts [64]. Use of such a model can help to 
avoid relying on assumptions that are believed to be true, 
even widely believed, but are not based in science.
The difficulty with diagnosis, assessment, and treat-
ment planning based on absence of verbal report, mem-
ory, and successful coping behavior for life events is 
threefold: (1) these assessments do not distinguish 
between disruption of behavior and lack of capacity, 
(2)   the absence of verbal recall and memory complicates 
cognitive-based treatment, and (3) a confounding issue is 1216
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that the same absent behavior can be observed at different 
times and contexts. Further complicating the process are 
changes in cognitive status that affect experience across 
time and context that can differentially affect current and 
future response. Learned nonuse provides objective scien-
tific understanding for why assumption based on neural 
pathway is insufficient to establish the specific relation-
ships between fear, trauma, and subsequent behavior. Fear 
conditioning provides objective scientific demonstration 
of learning without the cortex. Trace conditioning during 
sleep demonstrates human learning during rapid eye 
movement (REM) and non-REM sleep as well as differ-
ential expression of that learning during nonsleep. It is 
demonstrated that inference serves as a poor substitute for 
objective physiologic measurements, specific to time and 
context. In addition, the objective results may benefit 
future treatment efforts, as with CIMT. The preparation 
and possible inoculation of others, who may become 
exposed to similar trauma- and fear-based contexts, can 
also benefit. More importantly, such an approach does not 
require reliance on absence of behavior or nonscientific 
explanations.
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